Abstract-Jammers can severely disrupt the communications in wireless networks, and jammers' position information allows the defender to actively eliminate the jamming attacks. Thus, in this paper, we aim to design a framework that can localize one or multiple jammers with a high accuracy. Most of existing jammer-localization schemes utilize indirect measurements (e.g., hearing ranges) affected by jamming attacks, which makes it difficult to localize jammers accurately. Instead, we exploit a direct measurement-the strength of jamming signals (JSS). Estimating JSS is challenging as jamming signals may be embedded in other signals. As such, we devise an estimation scheme based on ambient noise floor and validate it with real-world experiments. To further reduce estimation errors, we define an evaluation feedback metric to quantify the estimation errors and formulate jammer localization as a nonlinear optimization problem, whose global optimal solution is close to jammers' true positions. We explore several heuristic search algorithms for approaching the global optimal solution, and our simulation results show that our error-minimizing-based framework achieves better performance than the existing schemes. In addition, our error-minimizing framework can utilize indirect measurements to obtain a better location estimation compared with prior work.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE increasing pervasiveness of wireless technologies, combined with the limited number of unlicensed bands, will continue to make the radio environment crowded, leading to unintentional radio interference across devices with different communication technologies yet sharing the same spectrum, for example, cordless phones, Wi-Fi network adapters, Bluetooth headsets, microwave ovens, and ZigBee-enabled appliances. Meanwhile, the emergence of software-defined radios has enabled adversaries to build intentional jammers to disrupt network communication with little effort. Regardless of whether it is unintentional interference or malicious jamming, one or multiple jammers/interferers may coexist and have a detrimental impact on network performance-both can be referred as jamming. To ensure the successful deployment of pervasive wireless networks, it is crucial to localize jammers, since the locations of jammers allow a better physical arrangement of wireless devices that cause unintentional radio interference, or enable a wide range of defense strategies for combatting malicious jamming attackers.
In this work, we focus on localizing one or multiple stationary jammers. Our goal is to extensively improve the accuracy of jammer localization. Current jammerlocalization approaches mostly rely on parameters derived from the affected network topology, such as packet delivery ratios [1] , neighbor lists [2] , and nodes' hearing ranges [3] . The use of these indirect measurements derived from jamming effects makes it difficult to accurately localize jammers' positions. Furthermore, they mainly localize one jammer and cannot cope with the cases that multiple jammers are located close to each other and their jamming effects overlap.
To address the limitation caused by indirect measurements of the jamming effect, we propose to use the direct measurement of the strength of jamming signal (JSS). Localizing jammers using JSS is appealing yet challenging. First, jamming signals are embedded in the regular network traffic. The commonly used received signal strength (RSS) measurement associated with a packet does not correspond to JSS. To overcome this challenge, we devise a scheme that can effectively estimate the JSS utilizing the measurement of the ambient noise floor (ANF), which is readily available from many commodity devices (e.g., MicaZ motes). Our experiments using MicaZ motes with multiple senderreceiver pairs confirm the feasibility of estimating JSS under various network traffic conditions.
With the ability to estimate JSS, it appears that one may leverage existing RSS-based localization algorithms designed for regular wireless devices to localize jammers. However, we consider jamming localization different for the following reasons: 1) Most jammers start to disturb network communication after network deployment, which makes it infeasible to obtain a site survey of radio fingerprints around jammers beforehand, a commonly used method for localization in an indoor environment. 2) No detailed prior knowledge about the jammers' transmission power is available. 3) Multiple jammers with overlapped jamming areas may collude and disturb network communication together, while attempting to hide their true locations.
To overcome these challenges and increase the localization accuracy, we formulate the jammer localization problem as a nonlinear optimization problem and define an evaluation metric as its objective function. The value of evaluation metric reflects how close the estimated jammers' locations are to their true locations, and thus, we can search for the best estimations that minimize the evaluation metric. Because traditional gradient search methods may converge to a local minimum and may not necessarily yield the global minimum, we adopt several algorithms that involve stochastic processes to approach the global optimum. In particular, we examined three algorithms: a genetic algorithm (GA), a generalized pattern search (GPS) algorithm, and a simulated annealing (SA) algorithm. Our extensive simulation results show that our localization error-minimizing framework not only can improve the estimation accuracy of localizing one jammer compared to prior work [3] , but also can estimate the positions of multiple jammers simultaneously, making it especially useful for identifying unintentional radio interference caused by multiple wireless devices or a few malicious and collaborative jammers. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
. Estimating JSS is challenging because the jamming signals are embedded in the regular signals. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that directly utilizes the JSS to localize jammers. Our results using direct measurements (e.g., JSS) exhibit significant improvement compared with those using indirect measurements (e.g., hearing ranges). . We exploited path loss and shadowing phenomena in radio propagation and defined an evaluation metric that can quantify the accuracy of the estimated locations. Leveraging such an evaluation metric, we formulated the jammer localization problem as an error-minimizing framework and studied several heuristic searching algorithms for finding the best solution. . Our error-minimizing-based algorithms can localize multiple jammers simultaneously, even if their jamming areas overlap. Localizing in such a scenario is known to be challenging [4] , [5] . We organize the remainder of the paper as follows: We introduce our threat model in Section 2. In Section 3, we overview our error-minimizing framework for localizing jammers and formulate the jammer localization problem as a nonlinear optimization problem utilizing JSS. Then, we address the challenge of estimating the JSS and present our real-systems experiment validation in Section 4 and Section 2 of the supplementary file, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TPDS.2013.33. In Section 5, we analyze several searching algorithms for solving the optimization problem. Next, we present the performance study of our error-minimizing-based localization approaches in Section 6 and in Section 3 of the supplementary file, available online. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. The related work is discussed in Section 1 of the supplementary file, available online.
THREAT MODEL
There are many different attack strategies that jammers can perform to disrupt wireless communications. It is impractical to cover all the possible jamming attack models that might exist. Thus, we mainly focus on one common type of jammer-constant jammers. Constant jammers continually emit radio signals, regardless of whether the channel is idle or not. Such jammers can be unintentional radio interferers that are always active or malicious jammers that keep disturbing network communication.
Besides, we assume each jammer is equipped with an omnidirectional antenna. Thus, every jammer has a similar jamming range in all directions. Identification of jammers' positions will be performed after the jamming attack is detected, and we assume the network is able to identify jamming attacks and obtain the number of jammers, leveraging the existing jamming detection approaches [6] , [7] .
We classify the network nodes based on the level of disturbance caused by jammers and identify the nodes that can participate in jammer localization, for example, the ones that can measure and report the JSS. Essentially, the communication range changes caused by jamming are reflected by the changes of neighbors at the network topology level. Thus, the network nodes could be classified based on the changes of neighbors caused by jamming. We define that node B is a neighbor of node A if A can communicate with B prior to jamming. The network nodes can be classified into three categories according to the impact of jamming:
. Unaffected node. A node is unaffected if it can communicate with all of its neighbors. This type of node is barely affected by jamming and may not yield accurate JSS measurements. . Jammed node. A node is jammed if it cannot communicate with any of the unaffected nodes. We note that this type of node can measure JSS, but cannot always report their measurements. . Boundary node. A boundary node can communicate with part of its neighbors but not from all of its neighbors. Boundary nodes can not only measure the JSS, but also report their measurements to a designated node for jamming localization. Fig. 1 illustrates an example of network topology changes caused by a jammer. Prior to jamming, all the nodes could communicate with their neighbors, shown as gray dots. Once the jammer became active (shown as a star), affected nodes lost their neighbors partially or completely. In the example depicted in Fig. 1 , the nodes marked as red squares lost all of their neighbors and became jammed nodes. The nodes depicted in blue circles are boundary nodes, because they lost part of their neighbors but still maintained communication capability to a few neighbors. Finally, the rest of the nodes that remained in gray dots are unaffected nodes, and they can still communicate with all their neighbors. Note that jammed nodes are usually those nodes located closest to the jammer, whereas the boundary nodes reside in between jammed nodes and unaffected nodes.
In this work, the boundary nodes play an important role, and our jammer localization algorithms rely on them for sampling and collecting JSS for jammer localization.
LOCALIZATION FORMULATION
Essentially, our jammer localization approach works as follows: Given a set of JSS, for every estimated location, we are able to provide a quantitative evaluation feedback indicating the distance between the estimated locations of jammers and their true locations. For example, a small value of evaluation feedback indicates that estimated locations are close to the true ones, and vice versa. Although unable to adjust the estimation directly, it is possible, from a few candidate locations, to select the ones that are closest to the true locations with high probability, making searching for the best estimate feasible. Leveraging this idea, our jammer localization approach comprises two steps: 1) JSS collection. Each boundary node locally obtains JSS. 2) Best estimation searching. Based on the collected JSS, a designated node will obtain a rough estimation of the jammers' positions. Then, it refines the estimation by searching for positions that minimize the evaluation feedback metric. The details are described in Algorithm 1. The search-based jammer localization approaches have a few challenging subtasks: In this section, we focus on formulating the evaluation feedback metric using collected JSS measurements. In particular, we model the jammer localization as an optimization problem. We delay the discussion of JSS measurement scheme MeasureJSS() to Section 4 and searching algorithms SearchForBetter() to Section 5.
Radio Propagation Basics
In wireless communication, the RSS attenuates with the increase of distance between the sender and receiver due to path loss and shadowing, as well as constructive and destructive additions of multipath signal components [8] , [9] . Path loss can be considered as the average attenuation, while shadowing is the random attenuation caused by obstacles through absorption, reflections, scattering, and diffraction [8] , [9] . Fig. 2 illustrates contours of an RSS and the relationship between shadowing and path loss. The attenuation caused by shadowing at any single location, d meters from the transmitter, may exhibit variation; the average attenuation and average signal strength on the circle centered at the transmitter are roughly the same [8] , [9] . This observation serves as the fundamental basis of our error-minimizing framework.
To illustrate our jammer localization approach, we use the widely used log-normal shadowing model [8] , [9] , which captures the essential of both path loss and shadowing. Let P f be the RSS subject to path loss attenuation only, and let the power of a transmitted signal be P t . The received signal power in dBm at a distance of d can be modeled as the sum of P f and a variance (denoted by X ) caused by shadowing and other random attenuation,
where X is a Gaussian zero-mean random variable with standard deviation , K is a unitless constant that depends on the antenna characteristics and the average channel attenuation, and is the path loss exponent (PLE). In a free space, is 2, and X is always 0.
Localization Evaluation Metric
In this section, we discuss the definition of the evaluation metric e z , and we show the property of e z as well as its calculation. For the ease of reading, we summarize the frequently used notations in Table 1 . 
The Property of e z
The definition of e z should have the following property:
The larger the estimation errors of jammers' locations, the larger the e z . We define e z as the estimated standard deviation of X derived from the estimated jammers' locations. Considering the one-jammer case, when the estimated jammer's location equals the true value, e z is the real standard deviation of X , which is relatively small. When there is an estimation error (the estimated location is e d distance away from the true location), e z will be biased and will be larger than the real standard deviation of X . The level of bias is affected by e d : The larger the e d is, the bigger the estimated standard deviation of X will likely be. The detailed relationship between e z and e d will be discussed in Section 5.1. Here, we illustrate the property of e z using the example depicted in Fig. 3 , where three boundary nodes are fd 1 ; d 2 ; d 3 g distance away from the jammer J. Let fX 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 g be the true shadowing attenuation between the boundary nodes and J, then e z is the true standard deviation of fX 1 ; X 2 ; X 3 g. If the estimated location of J is ðx ) has to be larger than the real one (X 1 ) to make up for the underestimated P We note that the relationship between e z and e d is independent to the distribution of X . Thus, in cases where the log-normal shadowing model does not match with the real radio propagation, e z can still provide quantitative feedback of e d .
Calculation
Single jammer. Assume a jammer J located at ðx J ; y J Þ starts to transmit at the power level of P J , and m nodes located at fðx i ; y i Þg i2½1;m become boundary nodes. To calculate e z , each boundary node will first measure JSS locally (the details will be discussed in Section 4), and we denote the JSS measured at boundary node i as P r i . Let the current estimation of the jammer J's location and the transmission power beẑ
Algorithm 2. Evaluation feedback metric calculation. 1: procedure EVALUATEMETRIC ðẑ; pÞ 2:
end for
5:
Givenẑ, we can estimate P f i , the JSS subject to path loss only at boundary node i as
The random attenuation (shadowing) between the jammer J and boundary node i can be estimated aŝ
The evaluation feedback metric for the estimationẑ is the standard deviation of estimated fX i g i2½1;m ,
where X is the mean ofX i . One of the biggest advantages of this definition is that by subtracting X , e z is only affected by ðx J ;ŷ J Þ and is independent of the estimated jamming powerP J þK.
Multiple jammers. Similar to a single jammer, we assume that n jammers located at fðx Ji ; y Ji Þg i2½1;n start to transmit at the power level of fP Ji g i2½1;n separately at the same time, and m nodes located at fðx i ; y i Þg i2½1;m become boundary nodes. To calculate e z , each boundary node measures JSS locally, and we denote the JSS measured at boundary node i as P ri that is a combined JSS from multiple jammers. We can include all the variables to be estimated, i.e., current estimation of the n jammers' locations and the transmission powers, in a form of matrix written as Fig. 3 . Illustration of jammer localization basis. When the estimated jammer location is e d meters from the true location, the estimated random attenuation is biased and the corresponding standard deviation is larger than the real one.
z ¼x
In the case of multiple jammers, p fi is the combined JSS from n jammers subject to path loss at a boundary node and can be calculated as
whered ji is the estimated distance between jammer j and boundary node i. Note thatP Jj ;K, and P fi are all in dBm. Then, the random attenuation between multiple jammers and the boundary node i can be estimated as
Thus, the evaluation feedback metric ofẑ is
where X is the mean ofX i .
Problem Formulation
Given the definition of the feedback metric (e z ), we generalize jammer localization problem as one optimization problem: Problem 1. where z are the unknown variable matrix of the jammer(s), for example, z is defined in (6), and fP r i g i2½1;m are the JSS measured at the boundary nodes f1; . . . ; mg. As we will show in Section 5.1, the estimated location(s) of the jammer(s) at which e z is minimized matches the true location(s) of jammer(s) with small estimation error(s).
MEASURING JAMMING SIGNALS
RSS is one of the most widely used measurements in localization. For instance, a WiFi device can estimate its most likely location by matching the measured RSS vector of a set of WiFi APs with pretrained RF fingerprinting maps [10] or with predicted RSS maps constructed based on RF propagation models [11] . However, obtaining signal strength of jammers (JSS) is a challenging task mainly because jamming signals are embedded in signals transmitted by regular wireless devices. The situation is complicated because multiple wireless devices are likely to send packets at the same time, as jamming disturbs the regular operation of carrier sensing multiple access. For the rest of this paper, we refer the regular nodes' concurrent packet transmissions that could not be decoded as a collision. While it is difficult, if ever possible, to extract signal components contributed by jammers or collision sources, we discover that it is feasible to derive the JSS based on periodic ambient noise measurement. In the following sections, we first present basics of ambient noise with regard to jamming signals and then introduce our scheme to estimate the JSS. Finally, we validate our estimation schemes via real-world experiments.
Basics of ANF
In theory, ambient noise is the sum of all unwanted signals that are always present, and the ANF is the measurement of the ambient noise. In the presence of constant jammers, the ambient noise includes thermal noise, atmospheric noise, and jamming signals. Thus, it is
where P J is the JSS, and P W is the white noise comprising thermal noise, atmospheric noise, and so on. Realizing that at each boundary node P W is relatively small compared to P J , the ANF can be roughly considered as JSS. Thus, estimating JSS is equivalent to deriving the ANF at each boundary node. In this work, we consider the type of wireless devices that are able to sample ambient noise regardless of whether the communication channel is idle or busy, for example, MicaZ sensor platforms; and derive the ANF based on ambient noise measurements. A naive approach of estimating the ANF could be sampling ambient noise when the wireless radio is idle (i.e., neither receiving nor transmitting packets). Such a method may not work in all network scenarios, because it may result in an overestimated ANF. For example, in a highly congested network, collision is likely to occur, and the collided signals may be treated as part of the ANF at the receiver, resulting in an inflated ANF. This is exactly the situation we want to avoid.
Estimating Strength of Jamming Signals
To derive the JSS, our scheme involves sampling ambient noise values regardless of whether the channel is idle or busy. In particular, each node will sample n measurements of ambient noise at a constant rate, and denote them as s ¼ ½s 1 ; s 2 ; . . . ; s n . The measurement set s can be divided into two subsets (s ¼ s a [ s c ):
1. s a ¼ fs i js i ¼ P J g, the ANF set that contains the ambient noise measurements when only jammers are active, and 2. s c ¼ fs i js i ¼ P J þ P C g, the combined ambient noise set that contains ambient noise measurements when both jamming signals (P J ) and signals from one or more senders (P C ) are present. Calculating JSS is equivalent to obtaining the average of ANFs, i.e., meanðs a Þ. In most cases, s c 6 ¼ ; and s a & s. In a special case where no sender has ever transmitted packets throughout the process of obtaining n measurements, s c ¼ ; and s a ¼ s. The algorithm for calculating the ANF should be able to cope with both cases. As such, we designed an algorithm (referred as Algorithm 3) as follows: A regular node will take n measurements of the ambient noise measurements. It will consider the ANF as the average of all measurements if no sender has transmitted during the period of measuring; otherwise, the ANF is the average of s a , which can be obtained by filtering out s c from s. The intuition of differentiating those two cases is that if only jamming signals are present, then the variance of n measurements will be small; otherwise, the ambient noise measurements will vary as different senders happen to transmit. return meanðs a Þ 10: end procedure
Algorithm 3. Acquiring the Ambient Noise Floor (ANF
The correctness of the algorithm is supported by the fact that s a is not likely to be empty due to carrier sensing, and the JSS approximately equals to the average of s a . The key question is how to obtain s a . To do so, we set the upper bound (i.e., JssThresh) of s c in Algorithm 3 as percentage of the amplitude span of ambient noise measurements. We validate the feasibility of obtaining s a using a filtering bound in the next experimental section.
Experiment Validation
To verify our algorithm that derives JSS, we conducted experiments involving one receiver and eight senders, which were implemented on MicaZ nodes. We deployed them on an outdoor playground as illustrated in Fig. 4 and conducted a set of experiments to evaluate the performance of Algorithm 3.
To study how well Algorithm 3 estimates JSS with a various number of colliding sources and the network traffic, we increased the number of senders sequentially from 0 to 8, and summarized the estimated ANFs in all four scenarios (in Fig. 5 ): no jammer, one jammer, two jammers, and three jammers. In general, the increase of the senders does not have much influence on the correctiveness of ANF estimation in all cases. Sender 1 transmitting at 20 packets per second did show a higher variance of estimation. That is caused by its low ambient noise sampling rate.
The detailed evaluation results are presented in the supplementary file, available online.
FINDING THE BEST ESTIMATION
The jammer localization problem can be modeled as a nonlinear optimization problem (defined in Problem 1), and finding a good estimation of jammers' locations is equivalent to seeking the solution that minimizes the evaluation feedback metric e z . In this section, we illustrate the relationship between e z and e d (the distance between the true jammer's location and the estimated one), which shows that greedy algorithms that search for successively better solutions are unable to find the global optimal value. Instead, we use several heuristic search algorithms that rely on guided random processes to approach the global optimum without converging to a local minimum.
Error Analysis
The evaluation feedback metric e z is a nonlinear function of the estimated location of jammers and the measured JSS values. To understand e z , we performed a numerical simulation and derived the numerical values of e z on a grid of points in a 300 Â 300 meter square, within which 200 nodes were randomly deployed with a transmission power of À45 dBm. Additionally, the jammer transmitted at a power level of À38 dBm and affected about 20 boundary nodes. To examine the impact of an inaccurate estimation of P J , we set the estimated jamming powerP j to À25 dBm, much larger than the true jamming power. To get enough resolution, we set the grid step to 0.5 m and, in total, calculated 360,000 data points for each network topology. We chose two representative network topologies and depicted their error contours in Fig. 6 , from which we drew the following observations:
1. Despite the inaccurate estimation of jamming power, the global minimum of e z is close to the true location of the jammer, suggesting that the estimated location that minimizes e z is a relatively accurate estimation of a jammer's position, even if the estimated jamming power is inaccurate.
2.
At each boundary node (marked by blue circles in Fig. 6 ), e z reaches its local maximum. This is because that at boundary node i,d i is close to 0, which makes logðd i Þ approaches infinity and causesX i to be an outlier. As a result, the estimated standard deviation (e z ) ofX is large. 3. Interestingly, e z is not strictly proportional to e d .
Although when the estimated location is in the close vicinity of the true value, the smaller e d is, the smaller e z becomes. When the estimated location increases to more than 100 m, the larger e d , the smaller e z . This is because when the estimated jammers' locations are further away from the boundary nodes, their distances to all the boundary nodes become larger than the real ones. In turn, all the estimated random attenuation fX i g at each boundary node are consistently overestimated and their standard deviation becomes smaller than the ones when part of fX i g are overestimated and part of fX i g are underestimated. The combination of the second and third observations makes greedy algorithms impractical. For instance, the gradient descent, which moves toward the steepest decreasing direction of e z , will not be able to climb the "hill" of the global maximum at a boundary node, nor will it be guaranteed to search towards the global minimum solution. Thus, we examine several heuristic searching algorithms to find the global minimum. In this work, these algorithms take the measured JSS as inputs; however, they are not limited to it.
Algorithm Description
A GA
A GA [12] searches for the global optimum by mimicking the process of natural selection in biological evolution. A GA iteratively generates a set of solutions known as a population. At each iteration, a GA selects a subset of solutions to form a new population based on their "fitness" and also randomly generates a few new solutions. As a result, the "fitter" solutions will be inherited. At the same time, new solutions will be introduced to the population, which may turn out to be "fitter" than ever. As a result, over successive generations, a GA is likely to escape from local optima and "evolves" toward an optimal solution.
In the application of searching for the best estimation of jammers' locations, each individual (i.e., a solution) has a chromosome of 3n genes, comprising n jammers' coordinates and jamming power levels. We defined the fitness of each individual as e z . The smaller e z is, the better.
A GPS
A GPS algorithm [13] works similarly to the gradient descent algorithm. However, at each iteration, instead of making a step toward the steepest gradient, a GPS checks a set of solutions (called a mesh) around the current solution, looking for the one whose corresponding function value is smaller than the one at the current solution. If a GPS finds such a solution, the new solution becomes the current solution at the next step of the algorithm. By searching for a mesh of solutions, a GPS is likely to find a sequence of solutions that approach an optimal one without converging to a local minimum.
An SA Search
An SA algorithm [14] searches for the optimal solutions by modeling the physical process of heating a material and then controlled lowering the temperature to decrease defects. At each iteration, the SA algorithm compares the current solution with a randomly generated new solution. The new solution is selected according to a probability distribution with a scale proportional to the temperature, and it will replace the current solution according to a probability governed by both the new object function value and temperature. By accepting "worse" solutions occasionally, the algorithm avoids being trapped in local minima, and it is able to explore solutions globally. As the temperature decreases, the annealing algorithm reduces its search scale so that it converges to a global minimum with high probability.
Reducing Searching Space
Aforementioned algorithms are all search based, and their efficiency depends on the searching space. To improve the search efficiency, we first limited the range of each variable. For example, the coordinates of jammers ðx J ; y J Þ should reside inside the jammed area, which can be estimated by examining the positions of both jammed nodes and boundary nodes. 1 We also restricted a jammer's transmission power to the range of ½À50; 0 dBm. Note that this restriction is less important in terms of minimizing localization accuracy, since our objective function e z does not depend on it. For the initial estimated position of jammers, we set the initial value to an estimation obtained by adaptive LSQ methods proposed by Liu et al. [3] for one-jammer cases, and we randomly selected jammers' locations somewhere inside the jammed area for multijammer cases.
PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our jammer localization approaches that utilize the error-minimizing framework. Detailed evaluations are presented in the supplementary file, available online.
We studied three heuristic search algorithms for finding the best estimation of jammers' position: a GA, a GPS algorithm, and an SA algorithm; and compared those three algorithms to the prior work by Liu et al. [3] , i.e., the adaptive LSQ algorithm. We developed a simulator in Matlab. We simulated the underlying radio propagation according to the log-normal shadowing model and used GA, GPS, and SA functions provided in the global optimization toolbox in Matlab. To make a fair comparison, we set the parameters of the shadowing model to the same values as the ones used in the prior work by Liu et al. [3] (e.g., the PLE ¼ 2:11).
We compared the algorithms in a variety of network configurations, including node densities, jammer's transmission power, the standard deviation of random attenuation, and the number of jammers. In addition, we examined our error-minimizing framework when indirect measurements (i.e., hearing ranges [15] ) are used. A hearing range is the area within which a node can successfully receive and decode packets, and it is affected by the jammers' locations and transmission power.
Impact of node density. We first investigated the impact of node density on the accuracy of localizing one jammer by deploying f200; 300; 400; 500g nodes in our 300 Â 300 meter network and fixing the jammer at the center ð0; 0Þ.
We depicted the median localization errors for our heuristic searching algorithms and adaptive LSQ algorithm in Fig. 7a . First, we observed that the GA, GPS, and SA all achieved almost the same accuracy and consistently outperformed the adaptive LSQ algorithm in all the node densities and deployment setups. Second, as the network node density increases, the accuracy of all algorithms improves.
Impact of the jamming power. To study the effects of various transmission power of jammers to the localization performance, we examined networks with 400 nodes in a 300 Â 300 meter field and set the jammer's transmission power to fÀ42; À40; À38; À36g dBm, respectively. The results are plotted in Fig. 7b , which shows that the GA, GPS, and SA outperformed the adaptive LSQ algorithm for all the jamming power levels.
Impact of propagation irregularity. To examine the impact of propagation irregularity on localization errors, we used standard deviation of random attenuation to quantify the propagation irregularity and compared algorithm performance in 400-node networks when the standard deviation was set to 1.0 and 2.0. From Fig. 7c , we observed that a larger standard deviation (i.e., 2.0) increases the median localization errors for all algorithms in both deployments. However, our error-minimizing searching algorithms can outperform the adaptive LSQ algorithms more in an environment with a higher degree of irregularity.
Impact of the number of jammers. Then, we examined the impact of the number of jammers on the localization errors. We studied the cases when f1; 2; 3; 4g jammers were emitting signals at À38 dBm, and the network was comprised of 1,600 nodes in a 600 Â 600 meter square, whose density is equivalent to 400 nodes in a 300 Â 300 meter field. For multiple jammer cases, we placed the jammers in such a way that all of them had overlapped jamming regions, since such an arrangement is difficult to localize. In particular, we placed the jammers symmetrically to the center of the network ð0; 0Þ with pairs of jammers 60 meters away. The coordinates are as follows: 1) two 1 . Even if in rare cases that the jammer is outside the network deployed area, the layout of jammed nodes and boundary nodes (e.g., at the boundary of the network) will indicate the jamming regions. jammers: ðÀ30; 0Þ and ð30; 0Þ; 2) three jammers: ð0; 35Þ, ðÀ30; À17Þ, and ð30; À17Þ; (3) four jammers: ðÀ30; 30Þ, ðÀ30; À30Þ, ð30; À30Þ, and ð30; 30Þ. Fig. 7d summarizes the median localization errors when one or multiple jammers were active. We observed that as the number of jammers increases, the performance of all algorithms decreases. Among three searching algorithms, the estimation errors of GPS did not increase as much as the other two, since in each iteration, GPS involves searching for a better solution using a fixed pattern (e.g., adding a fixed dispersion metric to the current solution to generate new ones), while the other two randomly generate new solutions.
Impact of using indirect measurements. Finally, we studied the performance of our error-minimizing framework using indirect measurements, for example, hearing ranges. Since a hearing range is affected by JSS, we are able to calculate e z according to the measured hearing ranges and find the estimated jammers' locations that minimize e z . We depicted the performance of algorithms utilizing hearing ranges in various node densities in Fig. 8a and in two setups of standard deviation in Fig. 8b . All the results show that the GA, GPS, and SA all constantly outperform the adaptive LSQ algorithm in all setups. Similar to the results using JSS, the accuracy of all algorithms improves as the node density increases and as the standard deviation reduces. The results also show that using indirect measurements cannot achieve as good localization accuracy as using direct measurements (e.g., JSS), due to that indirect measurements usually cannot capture jamming effects as precise as direct ones. We note that by using indirect measurements (e.g., hearing ranges), we can extend our error-minimizing framework to localize other types of jammers, such as reactive jammers. In summary, besides using direct measurements, our errorminimizing framework can leverage other types of indirect measurements to obtain an improved estimation of jammers' locations than adaptive LSQ.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we addressed the problem of localizing jammers in wireless networks, aiming to extensively reduce estimation errors. The jammers could be several wireless devices causing unintentional radio interference or malicious colluding jamming devices who coexist and disturb the network together. Most of the existing schemes for localizing jammers rely on the indirect measurements of network parameters affected by jammers, for example, nodes' hearing ranges, which makes it difficult to accurately localize jammers. In this work, we localized jammers by exploiting directly the JSS. Estimating JSS is considered challenging because they are usually embedded with other signals. Our estimation scheme smartly derives ANFs as the JSS utilizing the available signal strength measuring capability in wireless devices. The scheme samples signal strength regardless of whether the channel is busy or idle and estimates the ANF by filtering out regular transmission (if any) to obtain the JSS. We implemented an estimation scheme on MicaZ motes. Our experiment involving three jammers show that our estimation scheme can accurately derive the JSS from the measurements of ANF under various traffic scenarios.
To further improve the estimation accuracy, we designed an error-minimizing-based framework to localize jammers. In particular, we defined an evaluation feedback metric that quantifies the estimation errors of jammers' positions. We studied the relationship between the evaluation feedback metric and estimation errors, and showed that the locations that minimize the feedback metric approaches jammers' true locations and greedy algorithms may not find the global optimal solutions. Thus, we treated the evaluation feedback metric as the objective function for the error-minimizing purpose. We examined several heuristic search algorithms (GA, GPS, and SA) under various network conditions: node densities, jammer's transmission power, the propagation irregularity, and number of jammers. Besides, we examined our error-minimizing framework utilizing an indirect measurement-a hearing range. Our extensive simulation results show that our errorminimizing-based search algorithms utilizing both the direct and indirect measurements outperform the existing algorithms in all experiment configurations. In particular, among the three searching algorithms, we found that GPS can find the best estimation of multiple jammers' positions in the shortest duration. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
